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The right to peaceful protest in England and Wales is under graver threat than first
feared. On 24 November 2021, the highly controversial Police, Crime, Sentencing
and Courts Bill (PCSC) reached the final day of the Committee Stage in the House
of Lords. Just before midnight, Baroness Williams, for the Home Office, rose to
her feet – not to draw a long debate to an end but, remarkably, to introduce 26
pages of new amendments. These are not technical tweaks or mere clarifications
to the already highly controversial protest provisions of the PCSC, but jaw-dropping
measures that will expand police stop and search powers, increase restrictions on
peaceful protests, create new criminal offences and banning orders, and expand
delegated powers. What follows is a brief attempt to make sense of these illiberal
proposals. If enacted, they will have severe implications for how the law strikes
the balance between rights of protestors and the wider community. But even if not,
their very proposal, and the means of legislating for them, are further evidence of a
government with distaste, if not hostility, for constitutional norms of debate, scrutiny,
and accountability inside and outside of Parliament.
The political context
In the epoch of the climate emergency, and in the wake of the G20 Summit, it is with
some irony that, of all people, committed, peaceful environmental protestors emerge
as the bête noire in this tale of knee-jerk law-reform. It was Extinction Rebellion’s
“uprisings” – well-known for protestors gluing or locking themselves to things –
which prompted the Home Office, aided by the Metropolitan Police, to legislate
for restrictions on noisy and disruptive protests in Part 3 of the PCSC. But while
the Bill was making its way through Parliament, an autumnal wave of disruptive
highway protests by Insulate Britain caught the Home Office’s imagination. It was
an opportunity not to be missed. Tapping into public frustration with the disruption
being caused, and keen to promote her tough-on-crime agenda, Home Secretary
Priti Patel used her party conference speech in October to unveil a raft of measures
to “close down the legal loopholes” exploited by “so called eco-warriors, trampling
over our way of life and draining police resources.” The measures proposed are,
remarkably, more intrusive, discretionary, complex and pernicious than the original
ones – and yet, alarmingly, the Home Office continues to claim the amendments
amount to no more than a mere “modest updating” of the law. This is simply not so.
The proposed amendments 
In necessarily brief terms, here are the main features of the new proposals set to be
re-tabled by the government at the Report Stage in the House of Lords in January
2022:
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• A new offence of “locking on” where an individual attaches themself to
another person, object or land which causes – or is capable of causing – serious
disruption. But it goes further. It includes those who “attach an object to another
object or land”. What amounts to “serious disruption” narrows the “community”
test found in the Public Order Act 1986: the disruption need only be to at least
two individuals or an organization. This is accompanied by an inchoate offence
– “being equipped for locking on” – criminalizing those who have an object
intending to use it in connection with a “lock-on”. An offender will be liable to 51
weeks imprisonment and a fine
• New offences of (i) interfering with major transport works and (ii)
obstructing the construction or maintenance key national infrastructure.
All that is needed to satisfy the former is to move any apparatus which relates
to construction or maintenance or interfere with any inspections or repairs
taking place. For the latter, key infrastructure includes railways and airports but
also public highways, and even minor link roads. It is enough for someone to
prevent the infrastructure from being used or operated to any extent, for any of
its intended purposes. The maximum sentence is 12 months custody and a fine.
A new provision also increases the maximum sentence for obstruction of the
highway.
• New police stop and search powers and associated obstruction offence
where an officer has reasonable suspicion a person has an article made,
adapted or intended for use in connection with the above offences, obstructing
the highway or public nuisance. But it does not stop there. Where authorized
by an inspector, officers can exercise this power without suspicion for up to 24
hours within a specific locality. This is bolstered by a new offence of intentionally
obstructing an officer in the exercise of a suspicion-less stop and search, with a
maximum sentence of 51 weeks imprisonment.
• ‘Serious Disruption Prevention Orders’ for protest-related behaviour.
This will enable a court to severely restrict a person’s movement, associations,
protest activity, even internet activity, where there is a likelihood of the person
committing “protest-related offences” or causing “serious disruption”. All that
is required is that, on the balance of probabilities and relying on typically
inadmissible evidence, the person’s current offence is protest-related and
they committed another protest-related offence in the past five years or, in the
absence of any current offence, the person on at least two occasions in the past
five years was convicted of a protest-related offence, breached a civil injunction
or engaged in protest-related activity that resulted in serious disruption. Breach
of the order can result in 51 weeks’ imprisonment.
Some critical reflections
These new amendments exhibit lamentable features of contemporary criminal justice
policy:  criminalizing setbacks to second-order harms; relying on the civil law and
its standards to construct offences; bestowing ever more powers on police as a
panacea to deeper political fissures; increasing sentence severity incommensurate
to harm and culpability; crafting wide legislation to deal with a specific circumstance
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(or annoyance), without any review of, or consultation on, the probable impact. To
these, we might add four particular public law dimensions.
First, exercising the powers proposed will amount to varying – but likely significant
– degrees of interference with the right to peaceful protest, protected by Articles 10
and 11 ECHR. Restrictions under Article 11(2) include measures taken before or
during a gathering, as well as punitive measures taken afterwards. The Supreme
Court in DPP v Ziegler [2021] has recently re-affirmed deliberate obstructive
conduct which has a more than de minimis impact on others is not determinative
of proportionality; it still requires careful evaluation. Even where a “lock-on” device
is used, the majority in Ziegler also held that the duration of the obstruction is to be
evaluated according to the time during which the highway was actually obstructed,
not the time which protestors intended it to be obstructed. The fact that a protestor’s
actions clearly relate to a ‘matter of general concern’ – which the climate crisis
surely is – is also a factor relevant to the proportionality assessment. The defence
of “reasonable excuse” in the new offences will have much work to do in ensuring
prosecutions do not amount to an unlawful interference with the right to peaceful
protest.
Even in the absence of prosecutions, a second feature of the measures is their
potential chilling effect on those considering taking part in peaceful but disruptive
protests or those who know there is a risk of a sub-group of protestors using “lock-
on” tactics. The ECtHR held that crowd control measures should not be used,
directly or indirectly, to stifle or discourage protest. So too does an individual
continue to enjoy freedom of peaceful assembly even where punishable acts are
committed by others in the demonstration, provided that individual remains peaceful
in their own behaviour. Will would-be protestors now shy away for fear of having their
bicycle lock, or even their placard, banner or costume deemed by police to be an
object intended to be used by them or another to take part in a “lock-on”? Or, more
simply, will it deter those who do not want the hassle or indignity of a suspicion-less
stop and search, where a conversation, if interpreted as confrontational or hostile
by police, could result in arrest for the new offence of obstruction. This is most real
for those ethnic minority groups already disproportionality subject to police stops.
Another important aspect of the right to freedom of assembly is protestors’ autonomy
to choose their location, not least where being within sight and sound of the object
of the protest is crucial to participants. By criminalizing protests within the vicinity
of broadly defined “major transport works” and “key national infrastructure”, the
proposals risk dissuading or disrupting well-intentioned, peaceful protestors from
targeting sites of environmental harm where their message of protest is likely to have
its strongest impact.
A third feature concerns whether the exercise of these illiberal public order powers,
even if in pursuit of a legitimate aim, will satisfy the test of proportionality, specifically
when existing powers and offences offer a less intrusive means of protecting
the rights of others. It is already an offence to block highways. Police already
have powers to restrict protests, including where they cause serious disruption
to the life of the community or amount to a breach of the peace. And they are
using them. At least 146 members of Insulate Britain have been arrested 690
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times since September 2021, while a nationwide civil injunction has been granted
prohibiting further highway protests. Further still, HMICFRS’ review of public order
powers, commissioned by the Home Office, discredited prevention orders as neither
compatible with human rights nor an effective deterrent, stating “it is difficult to
envisage a case where less intrusive measures could not be taken to address the
risk that an individual poses”. Indeed, when first proposed, the Home Office had
dismissed such orders as unworkable and “very likely to lead to a legal challenge”.
Tellingly, most officers in the review expressed opposition towards a specific offence
of “locking on”. Experienced police commanders know that a response reliant on
stop and search, banning orders, and offences criminalizing vague, anticipated
harms, is neither operational feasible nor organizationally legitimate in the long run.
Finally, there are deeper constitutional tensions between the executive and
legislature at play in how these new amendments were introduced. They have
been tabled at the conclusion, not the beginning of the legislative process. They
were not sent by the House of Commons; they have not even been debated by
this elected house. They have not been reviewed by the JCHR. They have had no
Second Reading in the House of Lords. The debasement of the House of Lords,
by denying the revising chamber any meaningful scrutiny, was variously described
by its members as “democratic outrage”, “really scandalous” and “just wrong”. So
too do the new amendments exhibit what Lord Judge described as the “growing
constitutional wheeze” because they rely heavily on regulations to define key
aspects of police powers and legal thresholds that ought to appear on the face of
Bill. This makes the law unnecessarily inaccessible. The Home Office’s outright
dismissal of the JCHR’s concerns about the use of delegated legislation to define
key terms offers little by way of reassurance. The new provisions also enable the
Home Secretary to make guidance which police “must have regard to” in deciding
whether to exercise new coercive powers; such guidance is not be subject to
any parliamentary scrutiny, a technique criticized by the Delegated Powers and
Regulatory Reform Committee.
Conclusion
The right to peaceful protest is a qualified one. A fair balance must be struck
between the rights of the individual and the general interest of the community; Article
11 does not require domestic law or its enforcers to be held hostage to serious
disruption. This is especially so where such disruption is not directly aimed at the
object of the protest but instead at creating enough chaos to compel rather than
persuade others to act. Too much of the latter, not the former, seems to have led
Insulate Britain astray in the court of law and public opinion. But to use the old
adage, hard cases make bad law. The government has exploited Insulate Britain’s
protests to introduce a suite of measures that invites public authorities to stray
dangerously close to, if not beyond, the level of disruption to ordinary life that must
be tolerated if the right to peaceful protest, protected by Articles 10 and 11 ECHR,
is to have any substance. As Laws LJ remarked, rights worth having are unruly
things – inconvenient and tiresome, not least by others who are out of sympathy
with them. A government that champions free speech, individual liberty and popular
sovereignty should expect its citizens to relish the opportunity to engage in noisy,
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bold, eventful protests capable of effecting change. Was it not Boris Johnson, after
all, who vowed to lie down in front of a bulldozer to stop the construction of a third
runway at Heathrow?
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